

In 1949, after much legal haggling, Los Alamos became a county, and its citizens became legal residents of New Mexico with voting privileges in local, State and national elections. In 1957, the gates came down, and anybody who wanted to could come and go in the town.

Today, except for its rugged mountain setting, the community of bright green lawns and brilliant gardens looks just about like any suburban town. Its more than 13,000 residents enjoy an outstanding school system, a fast-growing shopping facility and plenty of recreation. The housing has never caught up with the demand and often seems to be losing ground, but the big hope for improvement lies in two burgeoning subdivisions, where land and homes are being bought and built by private individuals for the first time in the history of the Federal project.

But, if Los Alamos is still not quite a "normal" community, it soon will be. Last fall, President Kennedy signed a bill making possible the shift of commercial and residential property of the Hill from Federal to private ownership. Although the long process of platting, planning and appraisal has begun, actual sales are not expected to begin before mid-1964. Meanwhile, the AEC is planning more than \$8 million worth of construction and maintenance to put municipal facilities in good, salable shape, and the busy members of the Los Alamos County Commission are tackling the monumental job of preparing the community for self-government.

Many changes have taken place on Pajarito Plateau during the past two decades. Changes which have affected not only the community itself, but changes which have altered mankind's whole outlook on the world in which he lives. But, one thing will not change: the Laboratory's adventurous spirit and the unmatched natural beauty of the setting which provides much of the inspiration for that spirit.

With an impressive record of accomplishments behind it, and its hometown becoming what the AEC hoped in 1947 would be "a community satisfactory to scientists," the Laboratory can look to a promising future.

Many technological and scientific advances are predictable—achievement of flyable nuclear rockets and investigation of more sophisticated types of nuclear rocket propulsion; practical system for obtaining power from controlled fusion; fast breeding fission reactors; explorations in the field of molecular biology. Quite unpredictable, however, are scientific and technological breakthroughs. There were plenty of these during the Laboratory's first 20 years—there are certain to be many more in the future.

THE ROLE OF OUR INTELLIGENCE AGENCIES DURING THE CUBAN MILITARY BUILDUP: WHAT ARE THE REAL FACTS, AND WHAT CAN WE PROPERLY CONCLUDE?

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York [Mr. STRATTON] is recognized for 45 minutes.

(Mr. STRATTON asked and was given permission to revise and extend his remarks.)

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Speaker, as a member of the Armed Services Committee and as a former intelligence officer in the Navy I have been gravely concerned since last January with the sweeping and serious charges that have been made against our established Government intelligence agencies in connection with their performance in the Cuban crisis. For this reason I have awaited with great interest the release of the

report of the Special Preparedness Subcommittee of the other body, summarizing its findings in its recent investigation into this whole matter.

Mr. Speaker, now that this report has been released I feel constrained to say that I find myself baffled, mystified, and disappointed by it. Last January and February we found ourselves with a violent, almost hysterical attack being made upon both the integrity and the competence of our Nation's intelligence agencies. Either they cannot find out the real facts about Cuba, we were being told, or else they are deliberately covering up. This attack became so severe and so potentially damaging that on February 6 to quiet it, the Secretary of Defense went on nationwide television for 2 hours with material that only a few hours earlier had been classified as secret or top secret—a truly unprecedented undertaking, which, incidentally, was only partially successful.

It was against this background, Mr. Speaker, that the subcommittee moved to try to find the real answer to these grave and very disturbing questions. Were the intelligence people right—or were they not? The Congress ought to know, and the people ought to know, too.

This was the task to which the distinguished subcommittee set itself.

Now the verdict is in, Mr. Speaker, and I must say I am flabbergasted to see it: All charges have been factually disproved, but somehow the defendant has still not been acquitted. Instead he remains under suspicion, if he is not indeed actually found guilty at least on some counts.

I realize that the legislative process involves compromise, but surely when it comes to a question as gravely serious as the one that originally led to the subcommittee's inquiry, do not we deserve a more specific answer than that, if the facts at all warrant such an answer?

Yet here is a jury verdict with something for everybody, a strange amalgam of both fact and fancy which comes out clearly and positively exactly nowhere.

Surely if the facts point one way, Mr. Speaker, then we have a right, do we not, to expect that the conclusions will follow them in the same direction? Surely when the integrity and the competence of our top intelligence services have been so viciously attacked, the American people have a right to expect a more specific and forthright answer from this great subcommittee.

Let us look at this report. As I see it, every single one of the grave charges made against our intelligence services last February—both on and off of the floors of Congress—have been specifically and conclusively disproved by the subcommittee's report.

Let me just run down some of their findings, mostly in their own words:

The subcommittee has uncovered no evidence to substantiate charges and speculation about a photography gap having existed from September 5 to October 14. The evidence before the subcommittee leads to the conclusion that such charges are unfounded.

The news reports of an alleged conflict between the CIA and SAC with reference to the operation of U-2 high-altitude reconnaissance flights prior to October 14 were also closely inquired into and found to be without merit.

To a man the intelligence chiefs stated that it is their opinion that all strategic missiles and bombers have been removed from Cuba.

The intelligence community estimated that approximately 5,000 Soviet personnel were withdrawn from Cuba following the October confrontation. A net of 4,000 to 5,000 additional have been withdrawn since the first of the year, our intelligence people say.

That, Mr. Speaker, is a direct quote, as are the others, from the subcommittee's own report, and that adds up to a total estimated withdrawal of from 9,000 to 10,000 Soviet personnel. The report does not mention a single word about any evidence to support the charge, made in some quarters, that a comparable number of Soviet personnel—whether called troops or technicians—have newly arrived in Cuba.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STRATTON. I yield to the gentleman from Massachusetts.

Mr. MORSE. How many Soviet troops, according to the estimates of our intelligence sources, now remain in Cuba?

Mr. STRATTON. If the gentleman will permit me to develop my point of view as I have prepared it, I think that we can then discuss that subject a little later.

Mr. MORSE. Mr. Speaker, if the gentleman will yield further, will the gentleman agree that the presence of Soviet troops rather than the number of Soviet troops is the critical factor?

Mr. STRATTON. Well, I would say to my good friend from Massachusetts that I certainly agree with him that the presence of Soviet troops is a matter of concern, but what I am directing myself to, however, is a specific item with respect to the quality of our intelligence and with respect to certain suggestions that have been made in certain quarters that certain individuals have a different kind of intelligence from that available to our top intelligence agencies. Such a suggestion was made, for example, to the effect that as many troops or technicians, or whatever you want to call them, had moved back into Cuba in recent months as had been withdrawn earlier, and I am simply calling to the attention of the House the fact that the report of the subcommittee says that a total of 9,000 to 10,000 troops were withdrawn from Cuba since October.

And that there is not a shred of evidence in the report—I am not quoting—but there is nothing in the report to suggest that any number of troops or technicians or Soviet personnel ever went back into Cuba.

Mr. MORSE. If the gentleman will yield further, would the gentleman agree that there are still thousands of Soviet troops on the island of Cuba today?

Mr. STRATTON. Yes; and the reports substantiate that.

Mr. MORSE. Would the gentleman restate his quotation with reference to the "photography gap"?

Mr. STRATTON. Well, I do not mind debating with the gentleman, and I am always happy to talk with him, but my time is somewhat limited.

Mr. MORSE. I just missed the dates.

1963

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

8287

Mr. STRATTON. I have a rather long speech and it might, perhaps, be better for us to get in the discussion after I have had a chance to get it in the RECORD.

Let me say that the reference to the photography gap was a statement directly from the committee report that they looked into the charge of a photography gap, and I am sure the gentleman recalls when this was made, and it made big headlines, they looked into it and found that the charges were unfounded.

Mr. MORSE. Between what dates?

Mr. STRATTON. Between September 5 and October 14.

Mr. MORSE. If the gentleman will yield further, is it not a fact that there was no aerial reconnaissance surveillance of Cuba, during that period of time?

Mr. STRATTON. No, that is not a fact. The report—and I invite the gentleman's attention to it—lists the extent of the coverage and backs up the statement which it made and which I am quoting, that there was no gap between September 5 and October 14.

Mr. MORSE. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Speaker, here are some other points the report makes, in its own wording:

The intelligence chiefs do not believe that the Communist forces in Cuba now present a direct aggressive military threat to the United States or Latin America.

Offensive weapons systems were identified before becoming operational and their locations and performance characteristics spelled out in a limited period of time despite adverse weather and an almost completely closed society.

Photographic reconnaissance ultimately produced incontrovertible proof of the presence of strategic missiles and offensive weapons in Cuba. Credit is due to those involved in this mission.

It has already been indicated, during all of this period there was a great volume of unconfirmed reports and rumors from human sources about strategic missile-related activity in Cuba. None of these reports were confirmed prior to October 14, 1962.

And again, on this same subject, which incidentally lies at the very heart of the attacks which have been mounted against our intelligence performance.

During the July-August period refugee reports of alleged missile activity in Cuba increased significantly. These reports were checked out as scrupulously as possible, but even though many of them included consistent and similar descriptions of some form of missile activity there was no confirmation of them.

We have been reading a lot, Mr. Speaker, about those who had information before the President of the United States went on television on the 22d of October and how those who had this information were right and how the Government was wrong. Here a direct reading of the Senate document, which has not received the attention it deserves in the press, completely and totally refutes that kind of a charge.

The MRBM's were discovered while they were in the process of being deployed. The IRBM sites were discovered in a very early stage of construction. The IL-28 bombers

were discovered while they were still in their crates. The Mig 21's were discovered when only one had been removed from the shipping container.

CIA and military intelligence, by use of their highly developed photographic capability, were able to give a unique performance in intelligence operations. They ultimately placed in the hands of the President, his advisers and U.S. diplomatic representatives incontrovertible proof of the presence of Soviet strategic missiles in Cuba in direct contravention of Soviet Government assurances. This visual proof unquestionably played a major part in the united action of the OAS and world acceptance of the correctness of our position.

The intelligence community does not believe that in fact Cuba is now or has been a base for Soviet submarines.

Now, Mr. Speaker, I have here listed 11 specific points, in the language of the report itself, which I think are responsive to some of the charges we have all been reading in the press. These are the hard, demonstrated facts about our Cuban intelligence found by the subcommittee. They add up, in my judgment, to a simply overwhelming confirmation of an outstanding job done by our intelligence agencies in the Cuban crisis. And they conclusively refute and, indeed, demolish, Mr. Speaker, all the myriad charges we have heard raised on this floor and in another body about what was really going on in Cuba, or what was really known to someone with some specialized brand of "inside intelligence dope."

I think this is a tremendous verdict to be handed down by any jury, Mr. Speaker, and surely it should have demolished once and for all the nit-picking attacks that have been made variously on the competency and integrity of our Nation's intelligence services. Not only should these facts wipe out completely all of these efforts to cast doubt and suspicion on the performance of our intelligence agencies, surely they should give us a great sense of pride, both in the performance of our intelligence people and in the conduct of our Government leaders acting on the basis of that intelligence information.

Yet, Mr. Speaker, and this is the thing that disturbs me, and it is the reason why I have taken this time today, having clearly acquitted the defendant on the basis of the factual evidence, the subcommittee jury, by some strange legislative alchemy, then proceeds to find him guilty not on the basis of the facts but on guesswork. Let us take a closer look at this strange turn of events in the subcommittee report.

First, Having discarded the charge about missiles being hidden in caves, by saying that the intelligence chiefs "to a man" did not believe it, the subcommittee goes on to add:

However, they readily admit that, in terms of absolutes, it is quite possible that offensive weapons remain on the island concealed in caves or otherwise * * * based on skepticism, if nothing more, there is reason for grave concern about this matter.

What a strange statement, Mr. Speaker, that is. Anything, of course, is always possible. But are we living in a real world or are we living in a dream world? Do we act on the basis of facts

and evidence, or on the basis only of philosophical skepticism? Do we make our decisions on reality, or in terms of absolutes which can have no application to our real world?

Are we now suddenly to discard the reasoned, rational, realistic beliefs of every single one of our intelligence chiefs and to fall back instead on some appeal to absolutes and "nothing more" than philosophical skepticism as the touchstone of truth and falsity when it comes to Cuba? We certainly do not operate this way in any other agency of government; we do not operate this way in the business world; we most certainly do not operate on that basis in our everyday lives. Then why should we now suddenly be told that such an approach is a meaningful factor in assessing our Government's conduct in the Cuban crisis?

Or consider this statement in the report:

The deficiency in the performance of the intelligence community appears to have been in the evaluation and assessment of the accumulated data. Moreover there seems to have been a disinclination on the part of the intelligence community to accept and believe the ominous portent of the information which had been gathered.

And again:

It was not until the photographic evidence was obtained on October 14 that the intelligence community concluded that strategic missiles had been introduced into Cuba.

Mr. MACGREGOR. Mr. Speaker, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. STRATTON. I yield to the gentleman from Minnesota.

Mr. MACGREGOR. In connection with the point the gentleman made as to the verification of ballistics missiles in Cuba on October 14 for the first time, I would like to inquire whether the gentleman was in the House of Representatives on September 26, 1962—and I am quoting the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, page 19719—when the gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. RIVERS] advised the House as follows:

We have arrived, Mr. Chairman, at the point where we had better march together while time remains.

I got a lot of information over the 22 years I have been on the military committee, and I have other assignments from which I get information. They are loaded for bear in Cuba. Russia has missiles, and they are portable ones that can permeate the United States—and they are portable—from Havana, Cuba, to Norfolk, Va. And this is not idle talk.

Was the gentleman in the Chamber on September 26, 1962, some 3 weeks in advance of October 14, 1962, when the distinguished gentleman from South Carolina [Mr. RIVERS] made that statement without, I may add, any refutation whatsoever?

Mr. STRATTON. The gentleman knows I cannot recall specifically whether I was in the Chamber on a particular day.

Mr. MACGREGOR. This was during the debate on the Cuba resolution, and I assume the gentleman was here.

Mr. STRATTON. I know I was there that day, and was proud to vote for the

resolution. I do not recall the gentleman's statement being made. I have no doubt it was made.

Mr. MACGREGOR. I assure the gentleman that I have correctly quoted Mr. RIVERS' statement.

Mr. STRATTON. I would not take issue at all with what the distinguished ranking member of our committee said. I simply point out to the gentleman that what applies to the gentleman from South Carolina applies to the distinguished Member of the other body, with whom I have upon occasion taken exception with regard to this same point; namely, that there were a lot of rumors and reports of strategic missiles and of short-range missiles in Cuba prior to October 14. The point I am making is the point made by me in this body before, and now has been demonstrated and proven by the report of a subcommittee of the other body; namely, that until October 14 there was no proof, no confirmation of this charge. It is one thing to talk about rumors, and it is another thing to talk about proven fact. When you are going to take this country to the brink of nuclear war, as the President did on October 22, you had better be very sure that what you are talking about is a fact and not a rumor.

Mr. MACGREGOR. I have served, like the gentleman, in the intelligence branch of our military services. Would the gentleman not agree with the distinguished subcommittee of the other body that intelligence coming from a closed society covers a certain range of factual information, and the principal problem is proper evaluation and analysis.

Mr. STRATTON. I certainly would agree with the gentleman on that point. If the gentleman will bear with me a moment, he will see I am now moving into a discussion of this specific point. I am sure that after the gentleman has heard what I have to say, because of his background in the intelligence field and his own native sound intelligence, he will agree wholeheartedly with the statement I am about to make.

Mr. MACGREGOR. I await the gentleman's further remarks with bated breath.

Mr. STRATTON. I thank the gentleman.

Resuming the direct quotation from the subcommittee report on this second major critique which they make of our intelligence performance in the Cuban crisis:

It was not until the photographic evidence was obtained on October 14 that the intelligence community concluded that strategic missiles had been introduced into Cuba. In reaching their pre-October 14 negative judgment the intelligence analysts were strongly influenced by their judgment as to Soviet policy, and indications that strategic missiles were being installed were not given proper weight by the intelligence community.

Now, Mr. Speaker, I regret to say that this statement simply makes no sense to me. The report itself has already stated, as I mentioned just a moment ago, that until the U-2 flight of October 14 there was not a single bit of confirmation of

the human reports that strategic missiles had been placed in Cuba, even though they were most scrupulously checked out by our intelligence personnel. Are we now being asked to criticize our intelligence people because they did not conclude that strategic missiles were in Cuba before they had any confirmation of these rumors in their hands? What does the subcommittee think our intelligence chiefs should base their judgments on—confirmed fact, or fiction? Before October 14 the record itself says there was absolutely no confirmed proof of Soviet strategic missiles at hand. Our intelligence agencies would have been derelict indeed had they made any such conclusion then before the October 14 date. But we also know that as soon as the October 14 evidence was in, they immediately made the correct conclusion, and they passed it on swiftly to the President, and he in turn acted swiftly, courageously, and effectively. Does the subcommittee really think our intelligence agencies are open to reprimand because they failed to manifest psychic powers prior to October 14?

Again, the report says this:

Finally, the intelligence community was of the opinion that the Soviets would not introduce strategic missiles into Cuba because they believed that such a development would be incompatible with Soviet policy as interpreted by them.

Well, this may well have applied to some or even many in the intelligence community, but it emphatically does not apply to the chief of that intelligence community, Mr. John McCone, as the distinguished Senator from Washington, Mr. JACKSON, makes clear on page 7733 of the CONGRESSIONAL RECORD for May 9, the day the text of the report was made available to the other body.

The subcommittee report goes on:

The danger that such preconceptions will control the weighting of the facts as events unfold is evident.

And again:

It appears that on this point [about strategic missiles] the analysts were strongly influenced by their philosophical judgment that it would be contrary to Soviet policy to introduce strategic missiles into Cuba. In retrospect, it appears that the indicators to the contrary were not given proper weight.

Now, Mr. Speaker, this statement too makes no sense to me. I am sorry to say, the subcommittee's own report has made it crystal clear that whatever may have been the erroneous preconceptions and philosophical judgments of certain analysts within the intelligence community, they had not the slightest control or influence over the weighting of the facts, because from the very moment the reports of strategic missiles in Cuba came in, the Government did everything within its power to determine the truth of these reports. Checked them out, as the subcommittee itself commented, "scrupulously." That is a pretty strong word, Mr. Speaker. What more could it have possibly done? Whatever erroneous philosophical judgments there may have been, they had absolutely no impact on our actions. We were not lulled asleep, as at Pearl Harbor. We did not refuse to

check out all the evidence as at Pearl Harbor. Instead we did a fantastically thorough intelligence job that got results as quickly as humanly possible, even though those results proved to be contrary to the philosophical preconceptions of some people; and then finally we accepted that confirmed proof and we acted on it the moment it was received—as the subcommittee's factual findings also indicate. What a vast—and most fortunate difference—from what happened in the days before Pearl Harbor.

Finally, Mr. Speaker, we are told that the intelligence community erred by substantially underestimating Soviet troop strength in Cuba. Now let me make just two comments on this particular alleged error.

In the first place, there can be no other basis for determining Soviet manpower in Cuba except our own intelligence estimates. If our intelligence agencies can be said to have underestimated Soviet manpower this can only be so because they have now, on the basis of further information, come up with a new estimate. There is no other benchmark short perhaps of direct Soviet and Cuban announcements, Mr. Speaker, by which to measure real Soviet strength in Cuba, or an on-the-spot head count on Cuban soil. So to criticize the performance of our intelligence reports on the basis of other updated intelligence reports made by the same agency strikes me as an exercise in futility.

Secondly, the subcommittee appears to be laboring here, as before, under a misapprehension that intelligence cannot be good unless it is absolutely certain and 100 percent correct. Now nothing could possibly be further from the truth than that. Intelligence of the enemy must by its very nature be inexact, an attempt at approximating a truth that is deliberately and ingeniously being concealed from us. To criticize intelligence, even softly, simply because it is not accurate is to retreat once more into an unrealistic dream world of absolutes that bears no relation to reality itself. To insist that our intelligence services must have nothing but perfect scores would be like insisting on an airplane flying without the wing drag—without which sustained flight itself, of course, would be impossible—it just cannot in the nature of the case be done.

Now, Mr. Speaker, on the basis of this analysis, I think it should now be clear that as far as the facts developed by the distinguished subcommittee of the other body are concerned, the record of our intelligence services during the Cuban crisis, far from being open to doubt, suspicion or attack, is nothing short of phenomenal. The discovery of the strategic missile sites in Cuba was a major intelligence victory—and one which has been almost as much overlooked and depreciated in recent days as the military and diplomatic victory which was won by President Kennedy between October 22 and October 28.

Only when we leave the realm of facts behind, Mr. Speaker, and retreat into another world of absolutes and unattainable perfection can there be any basis for criticizing the performance of

1963

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — HOUSE

8289

our intelligence agencies in Cuba or for suggesting that the attacks which have been made against them have any real merit whatsoever.

I deeply regret, Mr. Speaker, that there has been this strange blend of fact and fancy. On the facts the committee developed there certainly could have been, and I believe there should have been, a clear, forthright, unmistakable, and conclusive rejection of all these unwarranted and irresponsible attacks that have been made against our intelligence agencies. The facts were there. The call could and should have been given, loud and clear.

Instead, Mr. Speaker, the trumpet has given forth an uncertain sound. Those who in months past have gained fame and notoriety by the suspicions they have tried to create about the performance of our intelligence agencies have unfortunately been given aid and comfort by the inconclusive nature of this report. Indeed, already they are citing the subcommittee document as proof of all their earlier charges.

But there remains one ray of hope, Mr. Speaker. This report is after all an interim report. Others, we are told, will be issued later on. I am indeed hopeful that when the final report is in, these curious contradictions will have been eliminated.

Unanimity is a great thing, Mr. Speaker. But let me say that I am hopeful that if the final report on this vital issue cannot come down unanimously solidly behind the ability and integrity of our intelligence services in the Cuban crisis, at least we will have a minority report to read which will state the record without hesitation or apology, as one chapter in American military history of which we can all be proud.

FOREIGN TRAVEL EXPENSES OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS SHOULD BE LIMITED

The SPEAKER pro tempore. Under previous order of the House, the gentleman from New York [Mr. HALPERN] is recognized for 15 minutes.

Mr. HALPERN. Mr. Speaker, I would like to congratulate the Members of this House for approving legislation that, upon enactment, would restrict foreign travel expenses of Members of Congress. The legislation is, of course, House Joint Resolution 245.

I feel strongly about this legislation and I trust it will win overwhelming support in the other body. My only regret is that the measure did not come before the House in the original, stronger and broader version as introduced by the distinguished chairman of the Committee on House Administration, the gentleman from Texas [Mr. BURLESON]. However, the legislation as passed by the House is a long step forward and I hope the first of many steps to follow.

It is true that the House Rules Committee during this Congress has tightened authorizations for matters pertaining to congressional travel. It is also true though that the Rules Committee actions do not have the permanence of law, and therefore, can be relaxed at will.

It is important therefore that travel reform legislation is enacted. Otherwise, Congress will once again be open to charges of practicing temporary and ineffectual cures, and of neglecting permanent and effective ones, in spite of the Rules Committee's notable efforts.

Commendable as this legislation is, it should be considered as only a first step by Congress in putting its Houses in order. The reform of travel expenditures, after all, is only one of many necessary reforms, few of which have been seriously considered lately by Congress.

The next reform measure that Congress should consider would provide for the examination of all congressional reform proposals. My bill, H.R. 1952, and several similar bills would establish a Commission on the Organization of Congress. I trust that the Rules Committee will give priority to this legislation and afford an early opportunity for hearings on it.

This Commission would recommend legislation that would take up where the Reorganization Act of 1946 and relevant legislation left off. Generally speaking, the Commission would study Federal legislative conditions, and then recommend improvements in the organization and operation of Congress.

The study would be undertaken with a view to altering Congress in the following ways: strengthen it, simplify its operations and make them more efficient, improve its relations with the other branches, and enable Congress better to meet its constitutional responsibilities.

The Commission's studies would include, but not be limited to, the organization and operation of the House and the Senate, and the relations between those two bodies. The Commission would also study the minute workings of Congress, including the structure and workings of all congressional committees and the relations among them, and the employment and pay of congressional employees. Furthermore, the Commission would study the relations between Congress, the executive, and the judiciary.

The Commission would be composed of at least seven Members from each House, with an initial party ratio of 4 to 3, in favor of the majority. These 14 Members would be supplemented by 2 more, with distinguished records of interest in public affairs, and appointed by the President of the United States, regardless of political affiliation.

A majority vote of the Members representing each House, taken separately, would be necessary for approval of Commission recommendations.

The Commission would make available to Congress not only stiffer organizational standards, but also standards of behavior. Standards in the latter regard have been, and continue to be, poorly defined, and as a result have contributed to unfortunate and misleading publicity.

The rules of Congress have been taken for granted at a time when nothing should be taken for granted. If Congress continues to neglect revision of its rules, the work upon public business will become only more haphazard. We

shall be charged with relying on rules that appear to be sound chiefly because Congress has endured, and not because such rules have aided in the dispatch of business.

It would indeed be tragic if Congress would change only when an aroused Nation forced it to change. Force breeds haste, violence, and unsound reform. Therefore let this Congress act not from forced impulse, but rather from seasoned deliberation, in order to provide for the inevitable.

NEW TEST-BAN PROPOSAL

(Mr. FARBERSTEIN asked and was given permission to address the House for 10 minutes.)

Mr. FARBERSTEIN. Mr. Speaker, on September 26, 1961, President Kennedy affixed his signature to a document. It was not an ordinary document, for it proclaimed to the whole world the desire of the American people to challenge the Soviet Union, not to an arms race but to a peace race. The document which the President signed on that day was the Arms Control and Disarmament Act. This legislation, of which I was a sponsor, received extensive consideration in the Congress and in the House Foreign Affairs Committee, of which it is my privilege to be a member. It passed by an overwhelming bipartisan vote of 73 to 14 in the Senate and 290 to 54 in the House. The purpose of the act was to create the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. By congressional mandate, it was to explore, recommend, and if approved by the President, negotiate possible alternatives to the arms race in order to enhance our national security.

Ever since its establishment, I have closely followed and strongly supported the activities of this Agency for peace. This year I introduced the first of many bills in the House to remove the \$10 million legislative ceiling on appropriations which was contained in the original act. Out of this \$10 million, \$8.33 million has been appropriated to the Agency during the year and a half it has been in existence. By comparison, almost \$50 billion was appropriated to the Department of Defense for fiscal year 1963 alone. If the work of the Agency is to continue, and if we are to continue to pursue safeguarded and informed negotiations in the field of arms control and disarmament, the legislative ceiling on appropriations obviously must be lifted.

I admit that I may not be as knowledgeable as some of the experts and technicians who are concerned with working out the details of arms control and disarmament agreements. Perhaps, though, this permits me, as it permits other Americans, to be more objective in my judgments. You have all read and heard about the controversy over whether or not our test-ban proposals are adequately safeguarded. Arguments have raged over whether or not our proposed verification system is adequate to detect Soviet cheating under a test ban.

For the most part, this concern has been directed at possible secret Soviet tests with a magnitude less than one-quarter the size of our first nuclear ex-

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